The Bush administration's plan for reconstruction in Iraq is based on wishful thinking, not realistic analysis. The challenge of rebuilding the country's infrastructure coupled with the heavy weight of Iraq's existing debt create a financial and political burden of enormous proportions. If the U.S. assumes a unilateral approach to the challenge, the endeavor will be crushing.

In the end, the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom will be tied to the success of the country's reconstruction. Already the restoration of order, the reinstatement of authority, and the reestablishment of basic services are presenting significant challenges. The magnitude of the entire undertaking will most assuredly be controversial and expensive.

The questions regarding Iraq's reconstruction are endless yet pressing. They include the optimal political structure for the country, the role of the U.N. and member countries, the role of Iraqi expatriates, the coordination of humanitarian efforts, the identification of appropriate Iraqi leaders within the country, and the appropriate length of U.S. involvement. Yet the Bush administration has said the U.N. will not control post-conflict efforts. One can only assume that the U.S. plans to make all decisions concerning Iraq. Taking this position, how can the administration expect the support of other nations?

Conservative estimates for maintaining peace-keeping forces hover at $1.5 billion a month.  Between 75,000 and 200,000 troops will be needed to restore and maintain order and engage in reconstruction activities.  Not surprisingly, the U.S. has requested that other countries send troops and share in this burden. Realistically, why should another country lend assistance given the nonexistence of a clear willingness to share in the decision-making process? U.S. citizens may soon face the prospect of shouldering the entire financial burden of maintaining these forces as well as funding the reestablishment of a working infrastructure.

Moderate sources of funding exist in Iraqi bank accounts frozen after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Most likely these will be applied to the salaries of Iraqi civil servants who will retain their jobs and assist in reestablishing governmental order.  The U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program has approximately $10 billion at its disposal.  These funds must be directed at humanitarian efforts along with funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The Bush administration is quick to argue that oil revenues and international support from organizations including the E.U. and the World Bank will provide significant financial backing for infrastructure reconstruction. Estimates of these costs range from $12 to $20 billion a year for the next five to six years. Is it possible that countries and organizations disenfranchised from major reconstruction decisions will engage in contributions to subsequent initiatives? Again, we must question whether realism has eluded the administration.  Clearly coalition members, with the exception of Britain, do not have the funds to aid in the reconstruction, and the Iraq administration most likely will not be functioning in a manner to generate sufficient tax revenues for quite a few years.

Apart from the costs of reconstruction are Iraq's existing debts and war reparation obligations.  Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project estimate that Iraq owes $383 billion to the international community.  Oil revenues, not to mention tax revenues, must be directed toward these obligations for years, leaving little to finance other objectives. Russia, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, China and France all hold standing agreements and/or loan agreements with Iraq.  Will countries barred from participating in post-war decisions be likely to consider refinancing agreements?  Yet failure to engage the international community will surely compromise Iraq’s development and democratization.

The Bush administration must be willing either to shoulder the entire financial burden of this enormous undertaking or allow the involvement of others.  One cannot help but compare the simplicity of this situation to those encountered on the schoolyard.  Share with others and they will share with you.  Otherwise face a lonely and perhaps challenging future.

If the administration remains inflexible, it must face financing Iraq's entire reconstruction. The U.S. managed this in Japan and Germany many years ago. Today's economy is quite different. The expense of a unilateral approach and the attendant weight on an already flailing economy will not be lost on voters in 2004.