A little over fifty years ago George Kennan, a leading architect of U.S. post-World War II foreign policy, used a dinosaur metaphor to describe the attitudes of citizens in democracies regarding foreign relations. Describing the dinosaur as having a body as long as a room and the brain the size of a pin, Kennan wrote that the animal is often slow to realize that his tail has been whacked. But when he does, he strikes out so blindly that he wreaks havoc on both the enemy and his own habitat. Kennan laments that taking an earlier interest in the world outside of his habitat would have allowed him to prevent him from losing his tail in the first place.
Fifty years later, Kennan's advice still holds up. One can be critical of terrorist acts without demonizing whole cultures, religions, and nations. Demonizing without taking an interest in the complexity of the world not only often produces counterproductive policies, it locks our real and imagined adversaries into demonizing us.
The images of bin Laden in print and broadcast media bring to mind images of two other Middle Eastern villains previously declared Public Enemy Number One: the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
Separated by 11 years, the Iranian hostage crisis (1979) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) were pivotal moments in the history of U.S. diplomacy toward countries of the Middle East. The conflicts also brought forth images of zealots and madmen, which in turn helped to demonize, by extension, Iranians and Iraqis.
Although President Bush has been careful to distinguish between Osama bin Laden's Al Queda organization and the vast majority of Muslims who wish the U.S. no ill-will, there is a risk that simplistic depictions of Osama bin Laden have locked us into a familiar pattern of condemning both a leader and his publics.
Demonization usually makes it even more difficult to use the diplomatic track in the resolution of foreign policy crises. This is one of the chief lessons from 1979 and 1990-91.
Iran's dramatic Islamic revolution in early 1979 produced an initially wary U.S. response. The takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, however, produced 444 days of constant references to the irrational zealotry of Islamic fanatics and to Khomeini's bizarre stubbornness. This in turn helped fuel Khomeini's likewise incessant portrayals of the U.S. as the Great Satan. Without Algeria's eleventh hour mediation, the standoff between the U.S. and Iran could have produced a much more serious military outcome than the failed rescue mission of April 1980.
Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was often depicted as a reincarnated Hitler, a bloodthirsty and vicious madman whose army had raped Kuwait. Repeated U.S. promises to teach Hussein a lesson (and the repeated post-1991 air strikes against Iraq) helped galvanize those in the Middle East, including Osama bin Laden, who deeply resented the presence of U.S. troops in the region. In blocking the end of sanctions against Iraq on the UN Security Council, the U.S. no doubt fuels continued outrage among significant publics in the Middle East.
Images of Osama bin Laden have taken yet another form, one that resonates powerfully with an earlier era. Descriptions of shadowy organizations, of cells and camps planted where we least expect them, along with announcements about the necessity for restricting civil liberties in the face of understandable panic and fear, recall our early 1950s encounters with the communist menace. As in the cases of Iran and Iraq, the U.S. resists genuine consultation with any other state in the region. Insisting that nations must state whether they are for or against our efforts to capture Osama bin Laden "Dead or Alive" is unlikely to foster the mutual respect and trust required for future complex negotiations with states and groups in the region.
Catherine Scott is a Professor of Political Science at Agnes Scott College. She has written on the Iranian hostage crisis and is currently researching U.S. Foreign Policy in the post-Vietnam era. |
